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COMMENTARY:
EvANS V. ROMER: AN "OLD" RIGHT COMES OUT
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part.'
INTRODUCTION
The timing of the decision was, at the very least, interesting. On October
11, 1994, National Coming Out Day,2 the justices of the Supreme Court of
Colorado announced the death of Amendment 22 Almost two years earlier,
Colorado voters had passed an initiative that amended the state constitution.
Amendment 2 rescinded existing laws and policies that prohibited discrimina-
tion against persons of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual" orientation.5 It fur-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). Madison
opposed allowing constitutional questions to be influenced by changing "public passions" repeat-
edly put "to the decision of the whole society." Id. No. 49, at 340.
2. Michael Booth, The Battle is Far from Over, DENY. POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at A10. "Com-
ing out.., refers to a process by which individuals who's [sic] gay, lesbian, or bisexual eventual-
ly comes to understand their same-sex interests and to take action to find a way to accommodate
that and come to understanding and perhaps express it." Record vol. 3 at 85, Evans v. Romer, No.
92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993) (Bayless I) (testimony of John C.
Gonziorek at the trial requesting a preliminary injunction). One of the plaintiffs at the same trial
testified:
Coming out of the closet is a series of steps that you take. For me, the first step was to
come out socially. That is, to identify with other gays and lesbians and go to places
where gays and lesbians congregate. The second step for me was to come out to my
family, all of my family, and let them know what my sexual orientation was. And the
third stage was to come out professionally and identify myself as an openly gay man.
Record vol. 4 at 47-48 (testimony of Richard Evans).
3. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (Evans II). Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based On Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen-
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisex-
ual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of, or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Con-
stitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30 (as it would read if amended by Amendment 2).
4. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (upholding the preliminary
injunction issued by the district court) (Evans 1). On November 3, 1992, Amendment 2 passed by
a margin of 53.4% to 46.6%. Id.
5. Amendment 2 rescinded laws and policies affecting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexu-
als. Supra note 3. In 1977, Aspen passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in employment,
housing, public services, and public accommodations based on numerous classifications, including
sexual orientation. ASPEN, COLO., CODE § 13-98 (1977). Boulder enacted a similar measure in
1987. BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 12-1 (1981). See Record vol. 5 at 46-47 (testimony of Leslie
Durgin, the Mayor of Boulder, noting that 51% of the people in Boulder voted in favor of adding
sexual orientation to the Human Rights Ordinance). Denver's anti-discriminatory policy was
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ther mandated that voters could only attain such a law or policy in the future
by reamending the constitution.6
Gay rights proponents challenged the measure in court.7 They advanced
primarily on the theory that Amendment 2 violated the fundamental right of
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to participate equally in the political process!
Following a lengthy legal battle, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed.9
Gay rights activists could celebrate victory over intolerance only brief-
ly.'0 On February 21, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the
passed in October of 1990. DENVER, COLO., CODE art. IV, § 28-91 (1990). In 1990, Governor
Roy Romer also issued an executive order prohibiting discriminatory practices in state employ-
ment. Executive Order in Celebration of Human Rights, Roy Romer, Governor (Dec. 10, 1990).
Insurance companies were prevented from determining insurability on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(vi) (1987 & Supp. 1992).
At trial, plaintiffs noted repeatedly that because Amendment 2 applied only to laws and
policies affecting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, heterosexuals would have a remedy under
law that was denied to those of other sexual orientations. Record vol. 4 at 154, Bayless I (No. 92-
CV7223) (testimony of John Bennett, Mayor of Aspen); Record vol. 4 at 208-09 (testimony of
Richard Evans, the Denver official who handles complaints concerning gay and lesbian discrimi-
nation); Record vol. 5 at 38 (testimony of Dani Newsum, the Director of Boulder's Office of
Human Rights). Plaintiffs also asserted that even if private companies chose to extend protection
to those groups, no remedy existed unless provided by the private entity itself because of Amend-
ment 2. Record vol. 5 at 57-59 (testimony of Leslie Durgin).
6. Supra note 3.
7. Opponents challenged the measure in state district court (Bayless 1). Judge Bayless grant-
ed a preliminary injunction. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at *12.
8. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 28-33, Bayless I (No. 92-
CV7223). Plaintiffs charged Amendment 2 violated other constitutional rights: (1) the First
Amendment right to freedom of association and expression; (2) the First Amendment right to
petition the government for redress of grievances; (3) the Establishment Clause by advancing a
particular religious view; (4) the guarantee of a republican form of government; (5) the Supremacy
Clause by preventing state courts from hearing federal claims of discrimination; and (6) the plain-
tiffs claimed Amendment 2 was impermissibly vague. They also raised several state constitutional
claims: (1) an initiative cannot place legislation out of the reach of the general assembly; and (2)
the home rule provisions grant power to municipalities to enact such laws. Complaint at 6-11,
Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223).
9. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the existence of the
right to participate in the political process when they upheld the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court. Id. The state appealed the second district court's decision granting a permanent
injunction in Evans II. In that decision, the court found no compelling state interest, narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest, and upheld the permanent injunction. Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1350.
Cincinnati, Ohio voters had enacted a similar measure at the city level one year after the
passage of Amendment 2. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 263-64 (6th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). Issue 3 was a
city charter amendment which prohibited the city from enacting any law or policy which gave rise
to a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. Gay rights proponents challenged the
measure in federal district court and won on a variety of issues, including the right to equal politi-
cal participation. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433-34 (S.D. Ohio),
affld in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S.
Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed and petition for certiorari
has been filed. This commentary will not address the Cincinnati case because of the pending Su-
preme Court action on Amendment 2.
10. See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1905 (1993) (discussing the increasing use of legislation to protect against discriminatory ac-
tions based on sexual orientation) [hereinafter Constitutional Limits]. Over the last several de-
cades, at least 139 jurisdictions have enacted legislation protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Id. at 1905. The increased visibility of gay rights activism produced a movement led by funda-
mentalist religious groups to repeal those anti-discrimination measures. Valerie Richardson,
Amendment Two, Act Two; Gay-Rights Foe Builds on Colorado Victory, WASH. TIMES, June 2,
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state's writ of certiorari." Fear rippled through the gay community, though
publicly, leaders painted brave faces. 2 Review of the Colorado decision justi-
fiably produced waves of apprehension because the current conservative Court
frowns on the birth of "new" fundamental rights.'3
This commentary proposes that the fundamental right exposed by Evans v.
Romer 4 saw the light of day long before the Colorado Supreme Court took
up its inquiry. When the nation's Founders debated the structure of our gov-
ernment, protecting the rights of minorities emerged as one of their primary
concerns. 5 While bestowing the right to vote created a democratic society,
the Framers worried that the power of the ballot box could stifle minority
rights. 6 Zealous majorities could override and trample any minority at the
polls. When the Supreme Court examines the constitutionality of Amendment
2, the Justices need look no farther than the Founder's words to uphold the
fundamental right to participate in the political process. 7
1993, at Al; see also George de Lama, Colorado Springs Showdown: Gays Facing Fundamental-
ists, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1993, "News" Section, at 1.
11. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (Evans II). An increasing reluctance by the Court to grant certiorari made the decision
more significant. Last year, the Court accepted only 99 cases from the nearly 7,700 petitioned.
Adriel Bettelheim, High Court Breaks Silence, Steps into Gay-Rights Arena, DENy. POST, Feb. 22,
1995, at A4.
12. See Jeffrey A. Roberts, Gays Equate Court Battle to Brown vs. Board of Ed., DENV.
POST, Feb. 22, 1995, at A4. One of the plaintiffs worried that review would put their lives on the
line, "jeopardizing their jobs and safety." Id. "This is our Brown." Id. (quoting Richard Evans, one
of the plaintiffs). But John Miller asserted that the developing middle ground in the Court would
provide a fair hearing. Id. See Howard Pankratz, Amendment 2 Showdown, DENV. POST, Feb. 22,
1995, at Al. Rabbi Steve Foster maintained that a ruling by the Supreme Court will "give us
some clarity." Id.
13. "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (holding that public education is not a fundamental right); see also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of the [Due Process Clauses], particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental."); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (declaring that
there is no constitutional right to minimal housing).
Some Justices have used a broader method and found a fundamental right if it was "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977). An unenumerated fundamental right is a right not explicity granted in the Consti-
tution, but is so basic as to be "implicity in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Ronald Dworkin concludes that "unenumerated" fundamental rights
differ from enumerated rights only in their level of abstraction. They both are derived from the
text of the Constitution. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should
Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 386-90 (1992).
14. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
15. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
17. Many Justices place great weight on the intent of the Framers. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 28-30 (1989) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist believes
that judges should not superimpose their beliefs and therefore should examine the intent of the
Framers to determine constitutional questions); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MoMENT 30-35 (1994) (explaining Scalia's approach
to constitutional interpretation as "textualist and originalist"). Even less conservative Justices con-
sider the intent of the Framers an important facet in clarifying constitutional issues. See e.g., U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (the opinion of Justice Stevens emphasized
and relied on the intent of the Framers to determine if states may set term limits on national repre-
sentatives).
1995]
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Additionally, the right to equal political participation has ridden silently
with us throughout the ages as the Court has travelled down the evolving path
of voting rights. As the Supreme Court examined our basic right to vote, a
doctrine emerged that recognizes more substance to the right to vote than
merely "one person, one vote."'8 The Court has acknowledged that the right
to vote is hollow without the ability to elect a representative who in turn will
have the ability to enact favorable legislation on the voter's behalf. 9
Most importantly, however, the Court's examination of Amendment 2
must supplement precedent with the most rudimentary democratic ideal: equal-
ity. Whether Amendment 2 interferes with fundamental equality depends on
two underlying questions. First, may a majority of a state's voters "fence out"
a group from participation in a level of government? Second, may a group of
citizens be denied the opportunity to ever elect a representative who can carry
their voice into the legislative halls? The Colorado Supreme Court answered in
the negative.2°
While the right recognized by Evans v. Romer finds its roots in history,
and is further granted legitimacy by democratic values, the court plowed new
ground in the area of equal protection analysis. Evans announced that a funda-
mental right to political participation cannot be denied to an "identifiable
group."'" By necessity, examination of this right requires weaving the funda-
mental right strand of equal protection analysis 22 with group concepts bor-
rowed from the suspect class strand.23 The Evans decision implied that ele-
ments used by courts to measure suspect class status 24 are also useful to eval-
uate the identifiability of the group denied political participation.' This new
"hybrid," if you will, of equal protection analysis could distract the Court from
the fundamental harm imposed by Amendment 2. In particular, the current
Court's aversion to breaking new ground26 combined with the judiciary's his-
torical reluctance to grant gays and lesbians suspect class status, 27 could
cause the Court to resist the invitation to adapt its equal protection analysis,
18. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
19. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (noting that the basic principle of
represenative government requires non-dilution of the electorate's vote); see also Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969) (noting that voting restrictions can be subtle as well as
obvious).
20. Evans 1I, 882 P.2d at 1350.
21. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
22. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 16-7 (2d ed. 1988).
23. Id. § 16-23.
24. Id. § 16-23, at 1545 (describing the criteria that the Supreme Court has used in its evalu-
ation of a suspect class as: historical discrimination, immutability, and politically weak or unpop-
ular).
25. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1284-85.
26. See Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993) (advising attorneys litigating before the Supreme
Court to get a good book on legal history).
27. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Homo-
sexuality, as a definitive trait, differs fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized
suspect or quasi-suspect classes."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); see also John F. Niblock,
Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REv. 153, 170-71
(1993) (summarizing the reasons courts have declined to apply suspect class status to sexual orien-
tation).
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and to leave Amendment 2's harm unremedied.
This commentary argues that the judiciary should focus primarily on the
historical origin of the right identified by the Evans court, and not get side-
tracked by the hybrid nature of the Evans court's equal protection analysis.
The harm that Amendment 2 would impose on gays, lesbians, and bisexuals is
exactly what the Framers intended to prevent when they chose a representa-
tional form of government." That a doctrine may have to be modified to
accomodate supporting that right should not preclude the Supreme Court of
this land from granting redress for the underlying harm.
Part I traces the history of the Amendment 2 litigation and details the
Colorado court's analysis from the viewpoints of both the majority and dis-
sent. Part II proposes that the Constitution's Framers intended that the struc-
ture of our government should protect us from the very evil unleashed by
Amendment 2.' Indeed, the fear of majority tyranny loomed large in the
words of James Madison. ° Part III suggests that political access may be un-
derstood in terms of vote dilution, and analogizes voting cases to Amendment
2's denial of effective participation.3 Part IV concludes that while this "new"
(old) fundamental right to political participation exists, it applies to groups
singled out in some way for different treatment.32 The proper review focuses
on defining what kind of "group" is entitled to protection in the political pro-
cess. In effect, this involves exploring the extent of a nexus between the harm
and the group it impacts. This section explores the parameters of the right
identified by Evans by using hypotheticals of other groups denied political
participation.
PART I: BACKGROUND
A. The Majority View
1. Voting Embodies "Effective" Participation.
Following the passage of Amendment 2, opponents challenged the mea-
sure in state district court.3 3 The district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that Amendment 2 burdened "the right not to have the State
endorse and give effect to private biases."34 The Colorado Supreme Court up-
held the district court's preliminary injunction, but found that the fundamental
right burdened by Amendment 2 was instead the "right to participate equally
in the political process."35 The court first announced that it did not create this
right.36 At the inception of the Republic, "the right of citizens to participate
28. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
29. Infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
30. Infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
31. Infra notes 160-94 and accompanying text.
32. Infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
33. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at *4. See supra note 8 for the various claims asserted.
34. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at * 11.
35. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
36. Id. at 1276.
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in the process of government" existed as a core democratic value.37 The
court's analysis then wove together a series of cases to find that an identifiable
group of people may not be "fenced out" of the political process." Each of
these cases supported the court's concern about denying "effective" participa-
tion, whether direct or indirect.
a. Direct Burdens on Voting Preclude Effective Participation.
First, the Evans court examined direct burdens on the right to vote, such
as requiring payment of a poll tax 39 or ownership of property' before grant-
ing access to the ballot box.4 These types of voting restrictions most directly
violate the Equal Protection Clause and have been consistently struck down by
the Supreme Court.42 The Evans court identified the danger of such precondi-
tions on voting rights as denying the electorate "any effective voice in the
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives."'43
The court carefully distinguished effective participation from successful
participation, holding that only the former is protected." Although Amend-
ment 2 does not deny gay rights proponents the actual ability to vote, it does
deny them the right to effectively participate in every layer of representational
government.45 On the initial level, voters could not vote for representatives
who have the power to work toward passage of anti-discrimination laws. At
the next stage, any elected representatives who wanted to pass anti-discrimina-
tion laws could cast their vote for every gay rights measure proposed, but
Amendment 2 would prevent the enactment of any favorable legislation. While
this distinction of successful versus effective seems subtle, the court relied on
three other categories of cases to flesh out the differences.'
b. Indirect Burdens Similarly Deny Effective Participation.
Limitations and conditions sometimes burden voters only indirectly. First,
the Evans court noted that reapportionment cases held that "meaningful" par-
ticipation requires equality of voting rights.47 Reynolds v. Sims' announced
that "the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among
the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1285.
39. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[W]ealth or fee
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications .... ).
40. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (limiting franchise to owners
of taxable property violates equal protection).
41. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1277.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627).
44. Id.
45. Amendment 2 would prevent the enactment of any "statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy" that provided protection from discrimination to homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals. See
supra note 3 for the exact language of the amendment.
46. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1277-79.
47. Id. at 1278.
48. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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weight to that of any other citizen in the State."'49 The Evans court relied on
Reynolds to conclude that the Constitution requires not only participation at
the ballot box, but equal participation."
Similarly, the Evans court found that candidate eligibility and ballot ac-
cess cases supported the right of effective participation.5 In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that restricting access to the ballot to only candidates
affiliated with one of the two major political parties indirectly burdened the
rights of voters to effectively exercise their franchise.52 The mere right to cast
a ballot was insufficient if voters could use their vote only in a limited fash-
ion." The proper inquiry in ballot access cases is whether the challenged re-
striction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the "availability of political oppor-
tunity. 54 A court must implicitly recognize the potential fluidity of American
political life, and ensure that the state does not freeze the status quo by deny-
ing access to independent candidates.55
2. Groups Have a Right to Effective Participation in the Political
Process.
Relying on another line of cases, the Evans majority rejected the argument
that only individuals enjoy the right to effective participation.56 The court
held instead that groups of citizens have an analogous right of effective partic-
ipation.57 The court examined cases dealing with communities that had placed
extra burdens on particular laws for successful passage.5" All of the laws at-
tempted to limit the normal political processes available to a group that de-
sired to enact favorable legislation. The Evans court reasoned that these cases,
woven together, implicitly recognized that government may not deny equal
participation to a "independently identifiable group" any more than to an indi-
vidual citizen.59 Viewed together, they gave substance to the right identified
by the Evans majority.
a. A Focus on Unfair Treatment- Hunter v. Erickson'
The most troubling factor for the Evans court was the unfair treatment
49. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
50. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1278 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)).
52. "By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters' ability to ex-
press their political preferences." Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
53. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1278. "The right to form a party for the advancement of po-
litical goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal
opportunity to win votes." Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
54. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (quoting Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709,
716 (1974)) (emphasis added).
55. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 817 (1983).
56. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279-82.
57. Id. at 1279.
58. See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
59. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
60. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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accorded to one group by the challenged measure. They first pointed to Hunt-
er, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a city charter amendment in Ak-
ron, Ohio that required any fair housing legislation to be ratified by a public
referendum." Other ordinances could be enacted directly by the city council,
with no submission to a popular vote.62 The Evans court found it significant
that, according to Justice White's opinion, Akron could require a city-wide
vote for all of its legislation, but could not single out one type for different
treatment.' Requiring more only for fair housing legislation imposed uncon-
stitutional special burdens on those who would benefit from such legisla-
tion.'
Critics (including the Evans dissent) asserted that the racial classifications
at issue in Hunter formed the basis for the decision.6" The Evans majority
spent much of its opinion answering this limited reading of Hunter. They
charged that the Hunter Court's use of voting cases, rather than a suspect class
analysis based on race, demonstrated the race context was neither a necessary
nor sufficient basis for striking down the amendment.' If the Hunter Court
had intended the decision to turn on racial discrimination, then it could easily
have relied on racial precedents.
b. A Discriminatory Purpose: Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 167
To bolster the argument that the Hunter decision was not simply based on
race, the Evans court utilized another case which expanded the concept of
unfairness to a particular group.' In Washington, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statewide voter initiative that prohibited local school boards from
busing students to achieve racial desegregation.' The measure allowed bus-
ing for other purposes, however, such as special educational programs, over-
crowded or unsafe conditions, or inadequate physical facilities. 70 The school
board, therefore, could assign students to other schools for various reasons, but
not to achieve integration.7' The Court noted that if the voter initiative had
61. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387). Significantly, just like
Amendment 2, the ordinance not only suspended the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but required the approval of the voters before any future ordinance could take effect.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90.
62. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90. The amendment "drew a distinction between those groups
who sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations in the sale and rental of real
estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other ends." Id.
at 390.
63. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1279-80.
65. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
66. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279-80. The Hunter Court cited Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), both of which involved reapportion-
ment and not discrimination based on race. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
67. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
68. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1280-81.
69. Washington, 458 U.S. at 470.
70. Id. at 462.
71. Id.
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placed "obstacles in the path of everyone," it would have withstood the consti-
tutional challenge."
The Washington Court clarified the Hunter decision. They identified the
"simple but central principle" underlying Hunter as Justice Harlan's "neutral
principles" doctrine." Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hunter, asserted
that facially discriminatory statutes that do not allocate power on the basis of a
neutral principle should be invalidated.74 The focus of the Washington Court
on power allocation moved the holding of Hunter outside the narrow bounds
of racial discrimination."
Not only was the burden placed on one particular issue, but it removed a
level of government participation from a certain interested group. Prior to the
state vote on the issue, local school boards had the ability to decide whether
busing was in the best interests of their district.76 Under the voter initiative,
busing advocates could no longer seek their remedy from local school boards.
A statewide vote would be required to change the busing policy, rather than a
local school board decision.77 The Washington Court noted that the initiative
burdened all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts
throughout the state, by lodging the decisionmaking authority over the ques-
tion at a new and remote level of government.7"
c. No Issue Singled Out- Gordon v. Lance79
The Evans majority cited one additional case to lend support to the argu-
ment that the two prior decisions (Hunter and Washington) were not racially
based, but instead turned on the faimess to any identifiable group of voters."0
In Gordon, the Supreme Court upheld a West Virginia statute that required an
increased percentage of voters to approve any bond indebtedness.8 ' The Court
distinguished Hunter because the required three-fifths majority applied to all
bond issues, and did not single out issues relating to a particular purpose, such
as school funding. 2 Only fair housing legislation was subject to public refer-
72. Id. at 470.
73. Id. at 469-70.
74. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (Harlan J., concurring). Harlan identified two classes of statutes.
Statutes which "have the clear purpose of making it more difficult for racial and religious minori-
ties to further their political aims" should be struck down. Id. The other category of statutes were
only enacted to provide a "just framework within which the diverse political groups in our society
may fairly compete and are not enacted with the purpose of assisting one particular group in its
struggle with its political opponents." Id. Clearly, Justice Harlan's neutral principle extended be-
yond racial classifications. The key factor in his analysis was if the statute disadvantaged (or pro-
tected, to the detriment of others) one group. Id.
75. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1281.
76. Washington, 458 U.S. at 479-80.
77. Id. While the Evans court did not specifically mention this diversion factor, the Supreme
Court in Washington found it significant. They noted that small communities who had operated
successful desegregational busing programs for years would find it difficult to gamer the neces-
sary statewide support. Id. at 484 n.27.
78. Id. at 483.
79. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
80. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1281-82.
81. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 2.
82. Id. at 5.
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endum in Hunter.3 Moreover, Gordon involved no racial classification, and
relied on Hunter without placing significance on the fact that the class dis-
criminated against in Hunter was a racial minority. 4
3. Amendment 2 Denies Effective Participation by Denying the
Opportunity to Enact Favorable Legislation.
Like the burdens placed on special groups that the Evans court examined,
Amendment 2 would restrict the ability of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to ever
participate equally in Colorado's political process. While they could cast their
vote, it would be an empty exercise because their elected representative could
represent in name only. Any favorable proposal would be doomed before the
legislative process began.
The language of the amendment itself violates the Hunter principle that
governmental power must be allocated based on neutral principles.85 Amend-
ment 2 would erect near-total barriers only for those interested in passage of
legislation that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. Other
types of anti-discrimination ordinances could be passed at the local level. All
other groups could carry their concerns to their representatives and request
action. Only gay rights proponents must resort to the electorate for passage of
favorable laws.
Before the passage of Amendment 2, local communities had enacted legis-
lation protecting citizens from discrimination based on their sexual orienta-
tion. 6 Amendment 2 would remove this level of governmental protection
from those local citizens and provide the opportunity for remedy only by
amending the state constitution. All other citizens pursuing legislative goals
could elect representatives to lobby for their interests, pass local ordinances,
and adopt state statutes, but gay rights proponents could only take their issues
to a statewide vote.
B. The Dissenting View
The lone dissenting justice in Evans took the majority to task in its analy-
sis of, in his view, these "race" cases.8" He argued that the laws struck down
in Hunter and Washington violated racial principles.8 Justice Erickson added
another case into the mix, James v. Valtierra,"9 which he concluded was dis-
positive." The James Court upheld a newly-approved provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution that mandated a voter referendum before approval of low-
rent housing projects.9 Prior to the constitutional amendment, each county
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 3.
86. Supra note 5.
87. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1293-1300 (Erickson J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
90. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1298 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
91. James, 402 U.S. at 139.
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and city had a public housing authority to take advantage of federal financing
opportunities.9' Significantly for Justice Erickson, the Supreme Court in
James distinguished Hunter by noting that the California provision under ex-
amination did not rest on "distinctions based on race." '93 The Court further
explicity stated that they would not extend Hunter.94
The Evans majority addressed the criticism of Justice Erickson by focus-
ing on the dissent in James.95 The three dissenters had argued that the consti-
tutional provision at issue discriminated on the basis of wealth.96 They ig-
nored the majority's use of Hunter, discussing instead the invidious discrimi-
nation against poor people on the face of the measure.97 The majority had
characterized the provision as only a benign economic classification.9" For the
dissenters in James, the issue did not fall into the narrower framework of who
warranted the protection given by Hunter. They instead examined the broader
question of who deserved suspect class status under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.99 The Evans court concluded that James, therefore, was best understood
as a case declining to apply suspect class status to the poor, rather than mak-
ing race a threshold requirement for the application of Hunter."m
To bolster this view, the Evans court further noted that the James majority
had all joined the later Gordon opinion.'0 ' The Gordon Court refused to
strike down a measure that required an increased number of voters to pass any
bond-indebtedness issues. '2 The West Virginia statute at issue involved no
racial classification."3 The Gordon opinion did not mention James."°4
Presumably, if the question turned on whether race was a prerequisite for the
92. Id. at 138.
93. Id. at 141 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
94. Id. Professor Derrick Bell observed that it was only Justice Black's devotion to the refer-
endum that could explain the James decision. Justice Black had written the majority opinion in
James, and was the lone dissenter in Hunter. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.R. 1, 3-7 (1978). "[D]evotion to the referendum presents
a serious danger to the civil rights of minority groups." Id. at 6. The James decision was also
criticized by zoning and planning experts who thought the voter referendum requirements "were
not imposed out of devotion to abstract principles of direct democracy. They were imposed to
raise difficult, and frequently insuperable, barriers to the provision of needed lower income hous-
ing or to change in the municipality's existing land-use regulations." ABA ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 93 (Richard P. Fishman
ed., 1978).
95. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
96. James, 402 U.S. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 143-44. The provision at issue, section 1 of California Article XXXIV provided:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner
by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as
the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon
such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that pur-
pose, or at any general or special election.
CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
98. James, 402 U.S. at 143 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 144-45.
100. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
101. Id.
102. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
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application of Hunter, the Court would have mentioned James, where the pro-
tection of Hunter had been denied.
C. Basic Values: A Representational Government
While both the majority and dissent in Evans articulate arguably support-
able positions, the initial declaration by the majority concerning the impor-
tance of citizen participation may be the most revealing of all."05 The extend-
ed discussions in both opinions may be missing the forest (the essential nature
and value of equal political participation in the structure of our government),
to concentrate on naming the individual trees (citing case law to reach a con-
clusion that has been inherent in our government since the founding fathers
created it).
What is more basic to the values of our republic than the ability of voters
to cast their ballots to pass favorable measures? The existence of the right to
equally participate lies at the very heart of our representative government."°
While Amendment 2 does not foreclose the opportunity to vote, it denies the
opportunity to pass favorable legislation. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, or
simply people who believe in equal access to government and a constitutional
right to non-discrimination, would have to go to the highest level of govern-
ment to advance beneficial legislation.
The denial of an opportunity to enact favorable legislative measures to an
unpopular (or any) identifiable group of voters violates the very notion of
equality upon which this country was established. As the Framers built the
foundations of our government, they sought to ensure that the power of a
majority could not usurp the rights of a minority. Their answer lay in choosing
a representative form of government, which is exactly what Amendment 2
threatens to destroy.
PART II: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
A. The Framers' Intent
When the colonies pulled free of Great Britain's yoke, the Founders
searched for tools to protect the fledgling nation. The ballot box offered the
greatest hope." They believed the constant threat of removal by the gov-
erned served to keep the hearts of the elected representatives pure."° This in
no way implied that the Framers placed any great faith in the judgment of the
people. On the contrary, James Madison greatly feared the "passions" of "fac-
tions." °9 Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
105. Id. at 1276.
106. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1716-17 (1993) (arguing that voting constitutes the concept of governance, which
does not end when the voter pulls the lever).
107. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 78 (1980).
108. See id. at 77.
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
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by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens .. ."11o
Madison recognized that unbridled freedom at the ballot box ensured only
that majority would rule. Voting constrains the "sinister views" of minority
factions by defeat at the polls."' The danger, however, lies in the sacrifice of
minority rights to the will of the majority. If the faction is a majority, then the
power of the ballot box "enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens.""' 2
Madison emphasized the preservation of minority rights throughout The
Federalist. "If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure."''3 "[T]he majority, having such coexistent passion
or interest, must be rendered ... unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of passion.""' 4 "In a society ... [in] which the stronger faction can
readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may be truly said to
reign.. . ."' ' As Robert Bork explained, there are "some things majorities
must not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the individual must be
free of majority rule.""' 6
Some commentators have argued that the Framers' concerns centered on
property rights, not a sense of justice for the "poor" minorities.' Following
that logic, unless the dispute involved property, the Framers' worries about
majoritarian tyranny would not apply. Others, however, have contended that
Madison's concerns extended not only to materialistic special interests
(factions), but also included a fear of religious "factions.""'  Madison be-
lieved that religion could inspire individuals to acts that would otherwise re-
volt their consciences."s' He observed that religion "[e]ven in its coolest
state... has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it."'2 °
110. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 60. "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republi-
can principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote ...." Id.
112. Id. at 60-61 (describing a "pure" democracy).
113. Id. NO. 51, at 351. Madison intended a moral dimension to the term "faction." See MOR-
TON G. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1987).
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
115. Id. No. 51, at 352. Madison implies that "oppression" is when "measures are ... decid-
ed, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior
force of an interested and over-bearing majority." Id. No. 10, at 57.
116. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139 (1990).
117. See Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONSTITUTION 1-17 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
118. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1022 n.16 (1984); see also DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FED-
ERALJST 76 (1984) ("It is clear from Madison's previous versions of Federalist 10's argument that
religious factions were his primary concern among opinionated parties."); Hans A. Linde, When
Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72
OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1993) (noting that at the time of the Constitution, while "interest" had a
specific economic meaning, "passion" included envy and revenge directed against other persons
(citing David Hume's TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE) (citation omitted)). Linde observed that the
U.S. Supreme Court had linked the guarantee of a republican government with protections against
"the sudden impulses of mere majorities." Id. at 33 (quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461
(1891)).
119. WHITE, supra note 113, at 133.
120. Id. at 133-34 (quoting 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 213-14 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3
Whether motivated by religion or property, Madison's concerns focused
on protecting minority factions from the power of the majority. 2' Undeni-
ably, gays provide the best example in today's society of the kind of minority
that the Framers were trying to protect: historically unpopular, and arousing
passion in those who oppose them.'22
eds., 1973)). Madison had considered the possibility that religious motives could help control a
factious majority. Id. Richardson, supra note 10, at Al; see also Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and
the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 216 (noting that many religious groups in
America condemn homosexuality).
Few could argue that the motivation and drive behind Amendment 2 was not religiously
based. Colorado For Family Values (CFV) sponsored the drive to gather signatures to place
Amendment 2 on the ballot. The mission statement for CFV provides that "Colorado For Family
Values is a non-profit coalition of Colorado citizens whose mission is to amend, through the ini-
tiative process, the Colorado State Constitution so as to prevent homosexual, bisexual and lesbian
orientation from being used as bases for the granting of protected class status or special rights."
The organization is based in Colorado Springs. Fundraising letter from Colorado For Family Val-
ues (on file with the author). Anti-gay advocates frequently recite the Bible to justify their opposi-
tion to homosexuality. Claire Martin, Many See Basic Values Under Siege, DENV. POST, Sept. 19,
1993, at D14. Evidence presented at the trial for the preliminary injunction against Amendment 2
characterized religious views toward homosexuality as "very black and white and simplistic."
Record vol. 3 at 102, Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of John C. Gonziorek). Describing
some of the CFV literature, Mr. Gonziorek explained, "Well, one of the articles particularly at the
end talks about after stating how horrible gay men and lesbians are, if they give up their homosex-
uality and embrace certain religious beliefs, they would be redeemed and good people." Record
vol. 3 at 103.
One particularly venonomous organization is named S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T. (Society To Remove
All Immoral Godless Homosexual Trash). Its publications include articles reprinted from other
sources, such as a Cal Thomas column equating the homosexual lifestyle with pedophilia. Cal
Thomas, Gay Rights? A Sign of American Decline?, S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T. (S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T., Denver,
Colo.), Vol. 1, Issue 4, at 1.
121. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
122. See Constitutional Limits, supra note 10, at 1906 (referring to the historical discrimina-
tion suffered by lesbians and gay men). Reported hate crimes have more than doubled from 1988
to 1993 in five major cities keeping consistent statistics. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homo-
sexuals, and the Constitution, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 387, 409 (1994). Much of the victimiza-
tion goes unreported because of the fear of increased discrimination. Id. at 413. Violence against
gay men in particular is often gruesome and brutal. Id. at 410-11.
For only a few of the more recent discriminatory actions suffered by lesbians or gays, see,
e.g., Cheryl Clark, Action by S.D. Fails to Stem Hate Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 4,
1995, at Al (listing various incidents, including: the murder of a young man whose attackers had
shouted "faggot," the whipping of one man by skinheads, and the stabbing of another man, whose
attacker had said he was "robbing queers"); Kevin Duchschere, Gay Man Alleges Abuse, Sues
Hennepin County, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 2, 1995, at B5 (relating story of
gay man who claimed two guards physically assaulted him); Mike Folks & Stephanie Smith,
Knight Found Guilty, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 30, 1995, at lB (describing the
defendant's reaction to a guilty verdict for murdering a gay man after setting out to "roll a fag-
got"); Ernie Hoffman, Witness Says Killing Suspect Kicked Victim, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
July 13, 1995, at B4 (relating the account of a witness who said that the defendant had said he
planned to kill a homosexual a few days before he beat a man to death); Gabriel Rotello, Busted
Heads and Twisted Minds, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1995, at A31 (describing an attack by skinheads);
Scott W. Wright, Car Dealer Sued for Not Selling to Man with Aids, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, July 21, 1995, at A10 (reporting a lawsuit filed by an AIDS victim who had been called
faggot and denied the purchase of a car).
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B. Representative Government as a Control
The Framers intended representative government to curb the excesses of
"factions."' 23 They believed that the individual nature of people prevents the
removal of the causes of factions. 24 The Founders sought instead to limit its
effects.' 5 Madison did not trust the motives of the people to limit factions,
but thought that the government should instead provide no opportunity for
oppression."' Hamilton wrote that a representative government "will be less
apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those
occasional ill humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which...
beget injustice . '. . ."' Madison believed that representative government of-
fered the best cure for the control of factions by "passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consideration."'2 s
Decisionmakers, removed from the heat of the moment, could reflect on rash
motives, and diffuse the possible effects of prejudice.'29
Representative government encompasses cooperation, coalition, and com-
promise. While individual voters may not persuade opponents to listen, legisla-
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). "[T]he
majority ... must be rendered ... unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppres-
sion.... A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes
place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking." Id. Without a
representative government, a majority faction is permitted to "mask its violence under the forms of
the Constitution." Id. at 60.
124. lId.
125. Id. "[I1t is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the govern-
ment. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government." Id. No. 49, at 343.
126. See WHiTE, supra note 113, at 135.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
Hamilton noted:
The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should
govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it
does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to
every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter
their prejudices to betray their interests.
Id. No. 71, at 482.
William Adams commented that voters, who are not subjected to a public process, are
much less likely to put personal prejudices aside in the privacy of a voting booth rather than the
legislator subjected to public scrutiny. See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot
Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy,
55 OHO ST. L.J. 583, 596-97 (1994).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982) (emphasis
added). Julian Eule referred to this as one aspect of "filtering" the majority will. Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1526-27 (1990). He noted that the
Founders had an inherent distrust of democracies. Id. at 1522. At the Constitutional Convention,
Edmund Randolph "complained of the 'turbulence and follies of democracy.' Elbridge Gerry
spoke of 'democracy as the worst of all political evils,' while Roger Sherman hoptedl that 'the
people ... have as little to do as may be about the government."' See Jules Lobel, The Meaning
of Democracy: Representative and Participatory Democracy in the New Nicaraguan Constitution,
49 U. Prrr. L.R. 823, 827-28 (1988).
129. Madison noted: "[T]here are particular moments in public affairs, when the people stimu-
lated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresenta-
tions of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most
ready to lament." THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (James Madison).
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tors meet over differing issues each day.'3 ° Alliances shift, and "[n]o one is
always in the majority; therefore, no one can afford to turn a deaf ear to the
needs of competing interests."'' But if a competing interest is robbed of the
opportunity to enact favorable legislation, then participation is squelched just
as surely as if a barricade had been erected at the voting booth.'32
Disempowered legislators would no longer possess the same ability to bargain.
They could still give their votes to other issues, but would be prevented from
lobbying other groups to gain votes for successful passage of their inter-
ests.'33 Participation in the elective process would be a hollow exercise be-
cause legislation may not ever be enacted on their behalf.
Amendment 2 robs gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and anti-discrimination advo-
cates of this right to representative government. Gays may elect representatives
who propose statute after statute to prohibit discrimination. The representatives
may form coalitions, and enact favorable legislation. Yet Amendment 2 pre-
vents "gay rights" bills from becoming law.'34 Amendment 2 forecloses an
avenue to equality, removes any check on the power of the majority, and
closes the normal avenues of government to gay rights proponents.
Proponents of the Amendment argue that gay rights advocates are not
robbed of their government: they may still vote, may still participate. 33 Ex-
amination of the functional meaning of a "representative" refutes this argu-
ment. Webster's defines "represent" in the context of a legislative body as "to
serve by delegated or deputed authority."'36 Further definitions include: (1)
130. Eule, supra note 128, at 1527.
131. Id. Bruce Ackerman has observed:
It was this invention of modem political science, not any increase in the quantity of
human virtue, which permitted the rational hope that Americans might succeed where
both ancients and modems had failed before them. Representative institutions permit us
to establish a regime encompassing millions of people with different religious and eco-
nomic interests. Although each faction would gladly use political power to tyrannize
over the others, their multiplicity permits the constitutional architect a new kind of polit-
ical freedom. Rather than suppressing faction at the cost of individual liberty, the suc-
cessful revolutionaries may hope to neutralize the worst consequences of faction by
playing each interest off against the others.
Ackerman, supra note 118, at 1025.
132. Matthew Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-Civil-Rights Initiatives: Protecting the
Ability of Lesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist Bazaar, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 574-
75 (1994) ("There are two ways to take away a group's power to participate in self-government in
a representative system. One would be to take away votes. The other would be to go to the legis-
lature and take away its power to ever enact legislation on the group's behalf.").
133. See Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Acts Jurispru-
dence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1993) (arguing that the political process entails more than
access to the ballot because a voter has a continuing interest in implementation of their
preferences through the efforts of the elected representatives). Participation in the process involves
both quantitative elements, such as election procedures, and qualitative measures that pertain to
the authority of elected officials. Id. at 1418.
134. See supra note 3 for the text of the amendment.
135. Brief for Petitioners at *26, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026 (U.S. Apr.
21, 1995).
136. WEBSTER's THSRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (1986). Madison explained
the difference between a democracy and republic: "It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and
exercise the government in person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their repre-
sentatives and agents." THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 84 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1982).
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"to bring clearly before the mind"; (2) "to exercise the rights of."' 37 All of
these terms imply an element of performance. "Bring" is defined as to convey,
carry or advance.'38 "Exercise" is the act of bringing into play or realizing in
action.' Even more persuasive is the definition of "representation": "a state-
ment of account especially made to convey a particular view or impression of
something with the intention of influencing opinion or action.'.' "Represen-
tative" government connotes the power to bring to action, while Amendment 2
erects a barrier to movement.
The Justices who embrace plain meaning can hardly ignore the definition
set forth by WEBSTER'S, and conclude that a representative could still "per-
form" his duties of representation by his impotent presence. 4' A sterile
stand-in for gay advocates eliminates all opportunities for consummation in the
political process.
C. Checks and Balances as a Control
The separation of powers provides another buttress to contain majoritarian
bullies.'42 Every reader of American history knows of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial checks designed to create a balance of power. Madison wrote
that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government should each
have a will of its own.'43 Each branch should have the ability to direct its
own course.'"
Not only was government oppression feared, but the threat of the masses
weighed on the Framers' minds. "If men were angels, no government would
be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary.' '45 "The divisions of power were
designed to check both the people's agents and the people themselves."'"
137. WEBSTERS, supra note 136, at 1926.
138. Id. at 278.
139. Id. at 795.
140. Id. (emphasis added). Proponents of the representation afforded gays and lesbians after
the passage of Amendment 2 would have enjoyed life before our Revolution. History buffs recall
that the colonists were "virtually represented" at that time, and King George never did understand
what all the strife was about. See ELY, supra note 107, at 82. Gays and lesbians are "virtually rep-
resented" under the passage of Amendment 2. No matter that their "representatives" have no
voice.
141. See Alex Kozinski, My Pizza With Nino, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1583, 1586 (1991) (de-
scribing Scalia's desire to defend the plain meaning of the Constitution: "Just as sure as AV's
pizza means AV's pizza, confront [in the Sixth Amendment] means confront").
Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that the source of fundamental rights must be the text or
the Framers' intentions. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REv. 693, 695 (1976). The Court recently affirmed its approval of adherence to the Framers'
intent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828, 1995 WL 306517, at *10
(U.S. 1995).
142. In a republic, "usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1982).
143. Id. at 348.
144. WHITE, supra note 113, at 161.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison).
146. Eule, supra note 128, at 1528. Even conservative commentators acknowledge the tension
between minority and majority rights. As Robert Bork observed, "The dilemma is that neither
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The Framers believed the same divide and weaken strategy could help
contain the excesses of the citizenry. 47 They did not intend for the majority
to have the power to vote this separation of powers away. Because of the
multiplicity of interests in the public, no clear majority could establish domi-
nance." "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicia-
ry, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether heredi-
tary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.' 4 9
The system of government created by our founding fathers relied on rep-
resentation and separation of powers to insure protection for minority factions.
Without those shields, minorities stand naked in the political process. Amend-
ment 2 effectively denies representation and an entire level of government to
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. They have no voice in their government, except
at the highest level; they may only attempt to amend their constitution. In
short, Amendment 2 places all control into the hands of the electorate, a pros-
pect that may well cause the Framers to spin in their graves. While commenta-
tors argue about the "factions" that troubled the Founders, Amendment 2 em-
braces all that the republican form of government was designed to prevent.
PART HI: ACCESS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Evans v. Romer uncloaked a fundamental value, supported by a network
of cases.' Critics will allege that this "new" right to political participation
deserves no legitimacy because our founding fathers did not precisely define
it.' ' Conservatives frequently deny the existence of protection to any value
not explicitly stated in the Constitution, unless it is one they prefer. 2
Even the hallowed right to vote itself did not appear enumerated until the
franchise was extended to include racial minorities by the Fifteenth Amend-
majorities nor minorities can be trusted to define the proper spheres of democratic authority and
individual liberty." BORK, supra note 116, at 139. He noted that there is "more to the Court's
constitutional function than defining in so direct a fashion the rights of the individual against the
state. There is the related task of maintaining the system of government the Constitution creates."
Id. at 140.
147. Eule, supra note 128, at 1528.
148. Id.
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982) (emphasis
added).
150. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
151. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at *5, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 466395
(U.S. Aug. 4, 1995).
152. See e.g., United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2027 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting an individual's right to retain their property); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
494 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding compensation is required for taking of
property); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) ("[A] most fundamental
human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made prof-
itable.").
Yet many values have been implicitly derived from the Constitution: the freedom of associ-
ation is not mentioned in the text, but it is recognized as a derivative safeguard of an individual's
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). The right to travel was considered implicit in the concept of a Union. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1968).
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ment.'5 Previously the right was implicitly derived from constitutional provi-
sions that detail the qualifications for elected officials.'54 But whether found
in explicit terms via the Fifteenth Amendment, or divined in the shadows of
the term qualifications clauses, the right to vote would be barren without the
accompanying entitlement to effective participation.'55
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental character of the right
to vote in Wesberry v. Sanders.'56 "No right is more precious in a free coun-
try than that of having a choice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."'57 Even in the preced-
ing century, the Court characterized "the political franchise of voting" as a
"fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."'58 The
Court reiterated that notion in Reynolds v. Sims:
[U]ndoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
153. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1. The Supreme Court noted many years after ratification of the Constitution:
"[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 178 (1875). Nearly half the amendments to the Con-
stitution concern the franchise and election procedures. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (procedures
for election of President and Vice President); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (apportionment rules and
limiting eligibility of Confederate officials for Congress); U.S. CONST. amend XV (vote not to be
denied because of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (governing election of Senators); U.S. CONST.
amend. XlX (vote not to be denied because of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (no more than two
terms for President); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (no poll taxes); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (must
be eighteen to vote).
154. Article I, § 2 established that the House of Representatives would be composed of
"Members chosen.., by the People of the several States." U.S CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 4
gave the states the ability to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections" with
congressional oversight. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article II, § 1 established the procedure to select
the members of the Electoral College. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
"The Supreme Court has used these provisions to support the proposition that the states,
because of this inherent constitutional authority to control the electoral process, can require per-
sons to meet certain reasonable requirements before they vote in state or national elections." JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.31, at 816 (1991). The Court
has consistently recognized the right to vote, while noting that a state has a legitimate interest in
regulation. Courts have upheld, for example, the right to restrict the franchise to convicted felons,
even though they served their sentences. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43 (1974). The
Court has upheld reasonable residency requirements. See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681
(1973) (upholding 50 day residency requirements for voting in local elections). The Court did not
allow Tennessee to proscribe a residency of one year. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
155. The Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to construct the fundamental right to
vote. It has recognized that the right to vote "is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Kenneth Karst defined equal citizenship as an individual's right to be "presumptively enti-
tled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.
Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized society to treat an individual as a member of
an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant." KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMER-
ICA 3 (1989).
156. 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
157. Id. Courts examine laws that restrict voting under an equal protection analysis because
the classification separates persons "who may or may not vote in an election or that dilutes the
voting power of a particular classification of persons." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, §
14.31, at 818.
158. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."9
A. Vote Dilution
Voting rights have evolved to recognize that voting encompasses more
than simply the casting of ballots. 6" The individual right of ability to vote
exists together with the group right of process.' If the governing body has
drawn the lines of a district such that a group will always be in the minority,
they have denied that group the opportunity to elect a representative or pass
favorable legislation.'62 That minority vote has been "diluted" to less, and in
most cases, meaningless, weight. The U.S. Supreme Court's examination of
vote dilution cases supports the assertion that the right to vote carries with it
the right of effective participation.
The "one person, one vote" standard of Reynolds'63 established districts
of equal population, but this did not negate the possibility of gerrymander-
ing. " Justice Harlan noted:
The fact of the matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly
compatible with "gerrymandering" of the worst sort .... The legisla-
ture must do more than satisfy one man, one vote; it must create a
structure which will in fact as well as theory be responsive to the
sentiments of the community.65
Two varieties of apportionment cases have plagued the courts in recent
times. Both involve drawing boundaries to influence the outcome of elections,
one on racial grounds, 66 the other on a political basis. 67 While Amend-
ment 2 obviously does not fall within the scope of racial discrimination as
such, it does involve the removal of a political voice. Both varieties of appor-
tionment cases serve to delineate the important principles.
159. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
160. See Abrams, supra note 133, at 1417-18.
161. See Samuel Issacharoff, Poliarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1857 (1992) (observing that the early
cases tried to avoid the inherent difficulties of assessing election outcomes by focusing on the
individual nature of the right). Vote dilution cases forced the Court to turn to a group-based inqui-
ry. Id. at 1859.
162. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can be
affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casing a ballot.").
163. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
164. The term "gerrymander" is derived from the combination of the last name of Massachu-
setts Governor Elbridge Gerry with the word salamander, which was the shape of a voting district
created in Massachusetts. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
165. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 549 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
167. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
[Vol. 72:3
AN "OLD" RIGHT COMES OUT
1. Racial Districting
The Court faced invidious racial gerrymandering head on when the Ala-
bama legislature passed a law that changed the city limits of Tuskegee from a
square to "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."'" The new boundaries sev-
ered almost all of the black residents from the city.'" This action deprived
these residents and no others of the benefits of voting in municipal elec-
tions.7 ° The reapportionment diminished the strength of the minority votes
to practically invisible levels.'' The Court invalidated the redistricting plan,
concluding that discrimination against a racial minority was a violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.' The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was subsequently
amended to handle the same issues that confronted the Court in Gomillion.'73
Congress specifically added that a redistricting plan may not dilute the voting
strength of a minority.'74
But what if the districting was done to benefit the racial minority? The
Court wrestled with the issue of "benign" racial gerrymandering in Shaw v.
Reno. 7' In Shaw, white voters challenged a redistricting scheme drawn to
specifically create two majority black districts.7 6 One district was "approxi-
mately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85
corridor."'77 One legislator described it as so "bizarre" that most of the new
district's voters could be murdered by a car driving with both doors open
down the interstate.'18 Unlike earlier decisions, the Shaw Court focused on
the equal protection rights of the white voters, finding a claim of an unconsti-
tutional racial gerrymander.'79 While the purpose of the redistricting was be-
nevolent, the Court concluded that drawing boundaries based solely on race
prolonged racial tensions and stereotypes.'" The Shaw opinion, written by
Justice O'Connor, explained that such practices would "undermine our system
of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they repre-
sent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole."'8'
Justice O'Connor's concerns apply equally to the representatives of gay
proponents. As elected officials, our representatives theoretically carry all of
our voices to the legislative halls. Under Amendment 2, a representative
168. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
169. Id. at 341.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 346-47.
173. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1971, §§ 1973 to 1973 bb-1 (1988)).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
175. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
176. Id. at 2819.
177. Id. at 2820-21.
178. Id. at 2821.
179. Id. at 2822, 2832.
180. Id. at 2827.
181. Id. (emphasis added). A recent Supreme Court decision attempted to clarify the Shaw
decision by explaining that it was "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution claim. Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995). Justice Kennedy explained that the reapportionment
scheme in Shaw separated voters strictly on the basis of race. Id.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
whose constituency includes gays, lesbians, bisexuals, or anti-discrimination
advocates would work only for a limited number of voters. Because Amend-
ment 2 would limit the action of a respresentative on anti-discrimination is-
sues, it would effectively reduce the constituency of that representative.
Amendment 2 would restrict the interests represented and undermine the sys-
tem of representative democracy.
2. Political Districting
The Supreme Court has tread cautiously down the road of reviewing
voting boundary disputes based solely on political inequities. The danger of
entering the "political thicket" 8 ' restricted examination of gerrymandering
claims to those based on race because of the political question doctrine.
8 3
Courts use caution when examining claims that involve the separation of pow-
ers." 4 The Court finally declared purely political reapportionment claims jus-
ticiable in Davis v. Bandemer.a5
Davis focused on the rights of groups of ideologically similar people to
cast a "meaningful" vote. 6 Republicans, who controlled the state legislature,
passed a redistricting plan."7 Democrats did not receive a majority of the
legislative seats available in the 1982 elections, even though they received a
majority of the statewide vote."u Justice White, writing for the Court, con-
cluded that a claim "submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group,
182. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
183. The political question doctrine forbids judicial determinations of legislative actions in-
volving separation of powers. 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 2D, § 3534.1 (1984).
184. Id. § 3534.
185. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Court had been reluctant to assert itself into the "political
thicket." 13A WRIGHT, supra note 183, § 3534. In a recent case involving racial gerrymandering,
the Court did not allow a vote dilution claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2587-88. (1994). In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas voiced his opinion that
gerrymandering claims required the judiciary to delve into political theory. Id. at 2596 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). The Holder plaintiffs challenged the single commissioner form of government,
which exercised both legislative and executive authority. Id. at 2584. Justice Thomas maintained
that there was no workable standard for choosing the proper size of the government body. Id. at
2596 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He further extended that reasoning to preclude
judicial interpretation of "effective suffrage, representation, and the proper apportionment of politi-
cal power in a representative democracy . I..." d. He noted that the Court's decisions have "im-
mersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory." Id. at
2592. But Justice Stevens rejected Justice Thomas' narrow reading of the Voting Rights Act and
his apparent inclination to overturn a long line of previous decisions. He explained:
There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve diffi-
cult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an interpretation that Congress has
thrice approved. Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments. The
Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic
orgainization. Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has required the courts to
formulate a theory of equal opportunity. Our work would cerainly be much easier if
every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary, but when Congress has legislat-
ed in general terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid difficult questions.
Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 123-24.
187. Both the state senate and the general assembly had Republican majorities and the gover-
nor was a Republican. Id. at 113-14.
188. Id. at 115.
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does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability."'' 9 He explained that a group
must exhibit a "lack of political power and the denial of fair representation" so
that they had "essentially been shut out of the political process."'" Mere suf-
fering at the polls was insufficient to lodge a successful claim.9 Rather, a
group of voters had to show they were purposefully being denied access to the
political system.'
The Court placed a high burden on political gerrymandering claims. "In
this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evi-
dence of continual frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effec-
tive denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political
process."'93 The challenged statute must demonstrate not only a discrimina-
tory effect, but also a discriminatory purpose."'
The analysis of political apportionment claims applies as well to Amend-
ment 2. Denial of fair representation presents an easy hurdle for Amendment 2
opponents. Representatives must have some ability to enact legislation on
behalf of the citizens they represent. Amendment 2 forecloses that possibility.
It denies one group of voters the right to representation and the opportunity to
enact favorable legislation. Amendment 2 mandates unresponsiveness in the
legislature. Amendment 2 denies gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and anti-discrimina-
tion proponents the opportunity to influence the political process.'95 The leg-
islation they seek to pass is forever placed out of their reach. Opportunity for
effective participation comes only by amending the state constitution.'96 This
presupposes that a historically unpopular group may in some way garner
enough votes to overturn Amendment 2.' Meanwhile, although they may
still access the polls, they are denied access to the accompanying right of
effective participation.
The Davis Court mandated that a group must show not only a discrimina-
189. Id. at 125. "[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole ... ." Id. at 132.
190. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
191. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2835. The Court has judged a redistricting plan unconstitutional
because of historic and present discrimination, together with the legislature's unresponsiveness to
the group's interests. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973).
192. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834-35 (emphasis added). Demonstration of discriminatory intention
was required to strike down a multimember district in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982).
A multimember district restricts the ability of a minority to elect representatives. id. at 616. "Past
discrimination had prevented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic Party affairs and
in primary elecions .... " The District Court thus concluded that historical discrimination had
restricted the present opportunity of blacks effectively to particpate in the political process. Id. at
625. The Court defined a minority as a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group. Id. at 616
(emphasis added).
193. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added). Some commentators have called for relaxation
of the court's usual rule of requiring a discriminatory purpose, considering the "legislators' keen
awareness of patterns of ethnic voting." KARST, supra note 155, at 94.
194. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133.
195. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
196. See supra note 3 for text of amendment.
197. See generally JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (providing a history of
discrimination against gays in America); see also supra note 122.
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tory effect, but also a discriminatory purpose.'98 Amendment 2 opponents
may easily prove the discriminatory intent behind the initiative. Although most
legislation fails to overcome that normally high burden, the volumes of ven-
omous literature and video tapes circulated by the proponents of Amendment 2
should suffice to demonstrate the required discriminatory purpose."' The po-
sition paper submitted by Colorado For Family Values °° (CFV) which pro-
moted Amendment 2 made it clear that one of the Amendment's purposes was
to curtail the potential success of the gay rights movement.2"' The semantics
of "special rights" drew on the insecurities and fears of the majority.2 2 Dis-
placed by decades of civil rights, the majoritarian middle contained an ugly
element that the religious zealots tapped.2 3 The Conservative Right knew
how to play on these fears of affirmative action, and mustered up enough
hatred to pass a clearly discriminatory initiative.2
The mere fact that "the people" initiated the discriminatory action does
not insulate it from violating constitutional principles. The Court concluded
long ago that "'one's right to life, liberty, and property ... and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.""'2 5 When Colorado voters attempted to apportion legislative dis-
tricts without due regard for proportional population, the Court held that con-
198. Davis, 478 U.S. at 127.
199. See David Colker, Anti-Gay Video Highlights Church's Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1993, at Al (describing a video tape produced by Bill Horn, who spliced outrageous segments of
amateur tape together); see also David Colker, Statistics in Gay Agenda Questioned, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1993, at A16 (describing brochures distributed throughout Colorado).
200. Colorado For Family Values is a non-profit organization that is responsible for drafting
and promoting Amendment 2. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
*4, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993). Pat Robertson's
National Legal Foundation assisted Colorado for Family Values in drafting the amendment. Id.
201. Record vol. 6 at 72-75, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo.
Jan. 15, 1993) (Bayless 1) (testimony of Paul Talmey).
202. The distributed videos and brochures played on people's fears about homosexuality. The
videos focused on gay parades and suggested that all homosexuals acted out sexual practices in
public. Additionally, a public perception exists that homosexuals are more likely to molest chil-
dren. Record vol. 3 at 109, Bayless I, (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of John C. Gonziorek at the
trial requesting a preliminary injunction). A number of studies confirm there is no relationship
between sexual orientation and child molestation. Id.
203. See Adams, supra note 127, at 588 (describing ititiative proposals which avoid hostile
epithets, but make reference to "special rights," "affirmative action," or "quotas"); see also Su-
zanne B. Goldberg, Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer's Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 665, 669-70 (1994) (describing the appeal to prejudice that anti-gay initiatives exhibit).
"[Tihe inititative supporters appeal to the notion, popular in some sectors of American society,
that minority groups are the beneficiaries of special privileges." Id. at 670. Amendment 2 played
heavily on the "special rights" theme. "Anti-gay organizers argue that gay civil rights laws afford
'special rights' to homosexuals, giving them claims to job quotas and other reparations previously
reserved for blacks, Hispanics and other minorities." See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283,
293 (1994) (quoting Michael Booth, Colorado: Gay-Rights Battlefield, DENY. POST, Sept. 27,
1992, at AI).
204. See Adams, supra note 127, at 606.
205. Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 659, affid per curiam, 368 U.S.
515 (1961) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(holding public school system could not sell or lease its buildings to alleged private school, but
maintain extensive control because purpose was segregation)).
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stitutional rules still controlled citizens' actions.2" Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly held that an amendment to the state constitution "is not
valid just because the people voted for it. 2 7 "An individual's constitutional-
ly protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a
vote of a majority of a State's electorate."20 8
PART IV: ANALYSIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
The Founders' words and the principles underlying voting rights make
clear that a fundamental right to political participation exists. The Evans case
focused on an "identifiable" minority being unable to effectively exercise their
franchise."° The nature of the right recognized by the Evans court, however,
depends on the proper definition of the group deserving protection.
A. What Is a "Group"?
The right identified by the Evans court cannot extend to every group who
merely supports a cause and loses at the polls. The language on the face of
Amendment 2 precludes the enactment of any anti-discrimination legislation
protecting gays, lesbians, or bisexuals except by a statewide vote to reamend
the constitution.2"0 Amendment 2 affects two groups, however: the group
who is denied the protective legislation and the group who supports anti-dis-
crimination and voted against Amendment 2. Any ballot measure creates win-
ners and losers. The right cannot be so broad as to "fence out" all of the los-
ers. Otherwise, every referendum and initiative could be declared invalid be-
cause some "identifiable group" (all the people who supported the losing posi-
tion) would be denied access to nearly all levels of government participation.
Many provisions in Colorado's Constitution that require referendums
would violate the right to political participation if its application only required
a losing "group." Voters have enacted provisions in the Colorado Constitution
requiring that some groups/issues face governmental hurdles: direct voter
approval must be gained to relocate the state capitol, 1 or to detonate a nu-
clear device.22 By dictating a statewide vote on those issues, the majority of
the state's voters have mandated that the minority sacrifice their right to repre-
sentation on that issue. Clearly, some restrictions213 on "representation" make
most Colorado residents feel good. They are happy to have the decision to
detonate in the hands of the electorate. What is it about Amendment 2 that has
206. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
207. Id. at 720 n.6.
208. Id. at 736.
209. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
210. Supra note 3.
211. COLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
212. COLO. CONST. art. XXVI, § 2.
213. Some Colorado residents are certainly "fenced out" of political participation at the local
level, or denied representation because they really want to pass local ordinances that allow nuclear
detonation.
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produced the opposite reaction of outrage? The element of discrimination
creates this bad feeling, and serves as the touchstone for application of the
right to political participation.
B. Is One Group Treated Differently?
When analyzing the challenged measure, the determination that a "group"
has been fenced out should begin with the question of fairness.2 4 Has an
"identifiable group" been treated differently?2 5 If all groups are treated
equally, then the only "fenced out" group would be those who voted against
the proposition. This group is not entitled to the right identified by the Evans
court. They have been treated evenhandedly, and are "identifiable" only in the
sense that they all supported the losing interest. Requiring a two-thirds majori-
ty in a statewide vote to approve nuclear detonation is such an issue. That
amendment does not identify a particular group, such as those living west of
the Continental Divide, and mandate that they alone should be denied the
opportunity to pass nuclear detonation legislation. While courts have identified
the importance of this unbiased treatment of groups, the language of the opin-
ions sometimes clouds the important considerations.
1. Case Precedent Identifies the Fairness Factor.
While the substantive consideration in cases like Hunter is the fairness
accorded to the group in question, commentators on Amendment 2, like the
Evans court itself, have concentrated on defending the applicability of three
cases (Hunter, Washington, and Gordon) to the right identified by the Evans
majority.216 This preoccupation with justifying the use of Hunter muddies the
water. The first question is: Are all groups treated equally? The inquiry of
who would benefit from a particular action serves to illuminate the discrimina-
tory purpose behind the restrictive law or amendment. When the Hunter Court
identified that the city charter amendment would impose burdens on "those
who would benefit" from fair housing legislation, it was using that group to
illustrate that the unconstitutional amendment unfairly treated one group differ-
ently."7
The Evans court's use of Gordon, the bond-indebtedness case, supports
this analysis. The Evans majority noted that the Supreme Court could find no
identifiable group that favored "bonded indebtedness over other forms of fi-
nancing," unlike Hunter, where the class singled out was clear.2 8 The
214. See discussion of Hunter v. Erickson, supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
215. See discussion of Gordon v. Lance, supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
216. See Craig C. Burke, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the Normal Po-
litical Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment Two, 69 IND. L.J. 275,
289-93 (1993) (noting that the right to participate in the democratic process was implicitly ac-
knowledged in Gordon); Niblock, supra note 27, at 180-87 (1993) (noting that one would be hard
pressed to deny that gays were a "politically identifiable group"); Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives
and Gay Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay
Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1097-1101 (1994) (observing that the explicit fights of free speech
and redress of grievances rest on the valve of participation in the political process).
217. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
218. Evans !, 854 P.2d at 1279. The class singled out in Hunter were those who "would bene-
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"group" in Gordon consisted only of those who lost at the polls.
2. An Identifiable Group Is Different than a Suspect Class.
When evaluating the group impacted by the challenged measure, the
"identifiable group" criterion should not be confused with the "suspect" class
criterion used to identify "discrete and insular" minorities.2 '9 Traditional
equal protection analysis protects all people from discrimination, especially
through the fundamental rights strand.22 That strand operates independently
from the suspect class strand, which provides heightened judicial scrutiny for
discrete and insular minority groups.22 ' If the "identifiable group" language
of Evans suggests a suspect class rather than a fundamental rights analysis
under equal protection, then it obscures the real concern. The proper inquiry is
whether one group or issue is singled out and treated differently. The disposi-
tive factor in Gordon was that all election matters involving bond indebtedness
required the three-fifths vote for passage. No issue, interest, or cause had been
"singled out." '222
The Evans court's entire discussion justifying the use of Hunter only
directs the inquiry away from what is truly significant.223 Gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals are treated differently from any other group desiring passage of anti-
discrimination ordinances. Communities may initiate anti-discrimination poli-
cies and ordinances and the state may enact legislation protecting all other
groups. But gay rights advocates must clear a higher hurdle: statewide voter
approval. They are prohibited from seeking protection except by amending the
state constitution.224
C. The Nature of the Harm
Under fundamental rights analysis, this singling out an "identifiable"
group for different treatment requires the court to apply strict scrutiny to the
challenged measure.225 To survive strict scrutiny, the state must show a com-
fit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
219. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Factors
which courts use to determine if a group is a suspect class include historical discrimination, politi-
cal powerlessness, and immutability. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-23, at 1545.
Evidence presented in the first trial defined the nature of a minority group:
A minority group is generally considered to be any group of individuals who have some
characteristic which is viewed as highly salient by the majority group and usually nega-
tively valued, and that one characteristic or cluster of characteristics is viewed to confer
similarity and it's believed that all people are of the same group, and that there is gener-
ally some consistency to the way the majority group treats the minority group, and
there's ususally some consistency in the way the minority group responds to that treat-
ment.
Record vol. 3 at 99, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993)
(testimony of John C. Gonziorek).
220. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, § 14.3, at 575.
221. Id.
222. Gordon, 403 US. at 5.
223. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1280-82.
224. Supra note 3.
225. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, § 14.3, at 575.
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pelling interest."' The court balances the asserted state interest against the
nature of the harm inflicted by denying the identifiable group the opportunity
to enact favorable legislation. Examination of the harm, therefore, can help
illuminate the right identified by the Evans court.
Consider the following hypothetical scenarios. First scenario: Colorado
voters pass a constitutional amendment that prevents the enactment of any
ordinance, policy, or statute that would restrict smoking in any way. In the
future, anti-smokers will have to reamend the constitution to gain protective
legislation. Second scenario: While health advocates desperately gasp for
breath, another constitutional amendment is passed by Colorado voters pre-
venting the enactment of any anti-discrimination legislation that protects blue-
eyed citizens. Are these groups entitled to the same protection under the right
identified under Evans? A fundamental right to political participation should
apply to everyone, right? Wrong.
The groups harmed by these laws (anti-smokers, people who have blue
eyes) are fundamentally different. Are anti-smokers and blue-eyed people
similarly situated to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals? If not, what is it about
Amendment 2 that makes its application so onerous? I suggest that it is the
nature of harm that is inflicted on the group by the denial of representation
and the resulting inability to pass favorable legislation. Prevention of the deto-
nation of a nuclear device except by a popular referendum sits at one end of a
continuum of harm. The risk of less representation to proponents of nuclear
power provides fewer nuclear blasts. Denial of civil rights reposes at the other
because the harm infringes on the very foundations of the government. The
guarantee of liberty and equality formed the basis of our Constitution. Some-
where in between on the continuum lies the prohibition of anti-smoking laws.
The risk of more smoke in our environment seems more injurious than the
possibility of a fewer number of nuclear detonations. At the same time, the
increased possibility of inhaling smoke does not rise to the same level of
injury as the denial of civil rights. Granted, the non-smoker may not breathe
deeply in a restaurant of his/her choice. While there may be some long-term
health implications from second-hand smoke, the harm inflicted on that non-
smoker is simply not as burdensome as preventing an entire group of people
from attaining equal civil rights. Non-smokers can seek smoke-free-environ-
ments, but groups denied civil rights cannot seek a different government.
D. Nature of the Group
If the harm is the prevention of civil rights legislation, whether of blue-
eyed people or gays, does that always entitle the group to survive strict scruti-
ny? I suggest another continuum. In this analysis, the harm is inextricably
linked with the nature of the group. The likelihood that blue eyed people suf-
fer or have suffered discrimination is small.227 While they have no control
226. Id.
227. See Winer, supra note 122, at 432 (advocating that conservative Justices examine reality
when they begin "slippery slope" arguments). "Could one not have argued in 1964 that the [Civil
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over the color of their eyes, eye color does not make them politically power-
less. Some Republicans even have blue eyes. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals fall
near the other end of the spectrum. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have been
historically discriminated against22 and have little political power.2 9 It is
arguable whether gays, lesbians, or bisexuals have any choice in their sexual
orientation preference23"
It is no accident that this sounds like a suspect class analysis. The proper
analysis consists of a nexus between fundamental right and suspect class anal-
ysis, a nexus between the harm and the group. Perhaps a referendum or initia-
tive should be subjected to heightened scrutiny if it denies opportunities for
governmental participation to a singled out "group," but only if the prohibited
law, ordinance, or policy directs a harm at a group who has been historically
discriminated against and who are politically less powerful. In this sense, both
the majority and dissent in Evans were correct. The majority identified that a
fundamental right existed,23" ' and the dissent pointed to the distinguishing
characteristic of the Hunter, Washington, and Gordon cases as involving some-
thing more than just denying the participation."'
As the Court examines the right identified by Evans, rigid adherence to
Rights] Act was inadvisable because if we protect African-Americans and Jews against discrimina-
tion, the next thing you know ozone and earth-orbit believers, Democrats and Republicans, will
claim the same protection?" Id. at 433. Winer argues in reality, hate crimes are inflicted against
homosexuals, not earth-orbit believers. Id. at 432.
228. See KATZ, supra note 197; supra note 122 (listing only a few of the more current dis-
criminatory actions against homosexuals); see also Niblock, supra note 27, at 159 (describing the
isolation that society has inflicted on gays and lesbians).
One of the plaintiffs at the Evans trial gave a first hand accounts of the feeling of isolation
that discrimination produces:
I never was able to learn how to be spontaneous. I know that I strike many people, co-
workers, other people with whom I have contact as very stiff, very distant. And certainly
it isn't that I mean to.... When I went into seventh grade, we rode the school bus into
Castle Rock, and I would hear the senior high school boys at the back of the bus talking
about queers, and I'm not even sure how but somehow I came to understand that they
were talking about people like me. And obviously, I mean the way they spoke about
them it was clear that they were not people with whom it was safe to be identified.
Record vol. 4 at 83, Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of Paul Brown).
229. See Niblock, supra note 27, at 169. According to most courts, this does not entitle them
to any suspect class status. They have struggled, therefore, to pass local anti-discrimination mea-
sures protecting them when they search for jobs and housing.
230. See Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L.
REv. 209, 237 (studies show a majority of homosexuals knew they were interested in the same
sex at a very early age, before sexual development). One of the plaintiffs testified about his early
knowledge in the Evans trial:
I knew that I was somehow different even before I entered puberty before things take on
any sort of sexual connotations. I would say, I don't know, I would say probably I was
probably like six or seven when I first really started to become aware that somehow I
was different, but I didn't know why or what, you know.
Record vol. 4 at 79 (testimony of Paul Brown). Brown said he wanted to change:
And I was frustrated too because I would pray earnestly, you know, that I would
change, that I wouldn't be gay anymore, or I think possibly at the time I still even
thought of the word "queer," but I was very fervently hopeful that a change would hap-
pen, and it didn't.
Record vol. 4 at 84.
231. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
232. See id. at 1301 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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the separate strands of equal protection analysis will only impede the effort to
give redress for the harm created by initiatives like Amendment 2. Admittedly,
scrutiny of the right to political participation may require the Court to forge
some aspects of the two strands together. This hybrid nature of analysis should
not deter the Court from focusing on the historical nature of the right. The
purpose of constitutional doctrines is to provide remedies for harms. When a
doctrine stands in the way of redress, then it becomes a tool that no longer
fits.
CONCLUSION
The founders of this country identified the problems inherent in a democ-
racy over 200 years ago: Pure devotion to the ballot box exalted only the
majority; minorities faced ,prospects of eternal damnation. By constructing a
representative government, the Framers attempted to ensure everyone received
absolution, by giving minorities protection against the majority.
Representation is built upon the principle that the elected official is an
agent for the citizen. Amendment 2 robs gays, lesbians, and bisexuals by
forever placing nearly every level of government out of reach. They may not
have any voice except by reamending the state constitution, an onerous burden
for a historically unpopular group. The Evans court correctly recognized that
this right to political participation had existed from the onset of the Republic.
At the same time, that old right blazes a new trail in analysis. Because of the
"group" nature of the right, aspects of suspect class are impossible to avoid.
No matter the label, the Justices of the Supreme Court have an opportuni-
ty to follow the road built by the Framers. Surely, even the most conservative
Justice will not sacrifice the principles upon which this country was founded
to surrender to factional prejudice.
Sue Chrisman
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